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I. Introduction
When we talk  about  'creative thinking'  we mean ideas which are new,
useful,  and they  must  also  be a  bit  surprising.  These are  ideas  which
propose solutions or make suggestions of a novel type, namely, not only
combining ideas that have not been combined before, but where their
combination is not even similar to previous combinations. This is what
makes  them  surprising,  over  and  above  being  new.  For  example,  the
Swiss Knife exempliﬁed a creative idea,  which was new, because these
particular items had not being combined before in one, but which was
also a new type of combination of functions of that type. It was novel, it
was useful, and surprising, as there had not even been anything like it
before. Creative ideas are found in industry, business, media, crafts and
arts,  in engineering  and in  science.  Nevertheless,  are  there  domains
where  creative  thinking  does  not  extend?  Are  there  domains  where
creative  thinking  might  even  be  inappropriate?  I  wish  to  address  the
question of creative thinking in the domain of emotions and social values,
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to investigate the possibility of the creative design of emotions and/or of
social values.
First,  let us address the question of whether we need to be creative in
relation to emotions and social values. By social values, I mean all types of
value we encounter in society, from personal to religious, cultural, social,
national, gender, racial etc. There has always been change in emotions
and  social values,  either  motivated  by  political  concerns,  or  national
circumstances,  or  personal  developments,  etc.  For  instance,  the  move
from determining  value  according  to  supply  and demand,  rather  than
according to the traditional criterion of exerted labour, was creative, when
ﬁrst introduced; so was the notion of a thief suing his victim for violation
of the thief's rights (Express 2011). Typically, such changes are gradual, but
they do eventually spread like waves in society. However, this is presently
changing. I will argue that creativity in designing new emotions and values
will  become  an  everyday  necessity  for  all  of  us,  on  account  of  the
dramatic  rate of  intrusive technological  change taking place in  society,
grounded on and informed by neurological research ﬁndings. I claim that
we need to learn how to design new emotions and values ourselves, in
view of the rate of social change we are beginning to experience, because
we cannot wait for the cycle of academics or politicians introducing new
theories/policies  of  emotion/value,  to  help  us  cope  with  the  changing
possibilities for attaining wellbeing in our daily lives
II. The need for a Creative Design of Social Values
To understand the possibility, reality and inevitability of rapid changes of
social values, one may consider ﬁrst the changes that have taken place in
public values regarding the acceptance of gay people, at ﬁrst, transsexual
changes later, same-sex marriage, homosexual clergy, etc. (Dimock 2013).
We  have  been  much  aware  of  such  value  changes,  because  of  the
publicity  of  their  struggles.  But  there  are  numerous  other  changes  of
values happening all the time without our realising the changes,  because
they do not need to enter into legislation. For instance, changes in our
values  of  privacy  (van  den  Hoven  et.al.  2016).  What  was  guarded  as
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private,  in  the  second  half  of  the  20th Century,  found  its  place  on
Facebook pages in the Millennials, motivated by social media companies,
peer pressure, and our desire for attention. There were of course also
reﬂective changes regarding such values, as the change in our attitude
from snitching to whistleblowing; the introduction, acceptance, and even
praise,  of  whistleblowing  since  the  1960's.  However,  there  were  also
unreﬂective  changes  of  value,  as  the  request  to  declare  and  keep
updating  one's  'Status'  on  Facebook,  which  encouraged  divulging
personal information very publicly, information that would have formerly
been  kept  private  to  the  individual  (Mullins  2016).  Peer  pressure,
conformity, keeping up, etc., are all platforms for the exchange of values
for social preferables of one kind or another.
Social values can also be hacked. Consider subliminal advertising (Merikle
2017).  Its  purpose  is  to  inﬂuence  the  viewer  positively  for  a  product,
without the viewer realising the reasons for the positive disposition they
develop towards this product. The subliminal messages may be benign,
e.g. a soft colour, but they may also be reprehensible. In either case, the
user  is  developing  a  positive  disposition  without  being  aware  of  the
reasons  that  are  engineered  to  produce  it  in  her.  The  possibilities  of
value-hacking are increasing as we speak, with the spread of social media
and  the  digital  methods  they  continuously  innovate  to  generate  new
methods of inﬂuencing their users, or worse, with the way their networks
can  be  used  by  others  for  their  purposes. Children  are  naturally
particularly vulnerable (Knorr 2014).
Although subliminal advertising and more generally value hacking have
made a negative impression on us, technology is now generating positive
reasons  for  deferring  judgement  regarding  impact  to  machines  –  to
algorithms. This is not a new trend that might affect our social values; it is
an avalanche of  social-value-change that  will  hit  society  in  the coming
decade and beyond.
One area that  will  make severe demands on the design of  new social
values is the new Generation of the Internet of Things (IoT) (Pieroni et.al.
2015). Smart 'things' will interact with us, on the basis of values that have
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been  programmed  in  them,  or  which  they  have  algorithmically  deep-
learned or developed, and which will determine their behaviour towards
us. Will we leave it to the digital technologists to choose what values to
code into smart technology that will interact with adults, the elderly and
children? Whose choice should this be? Should the requisite values for
smart  technology  be  replicas  of  our  values  or  different?  Are  we
communicating with persons or  machines? Who will  decide which and
what? Digital companies are not waiting to ﬁnd out. If machines are to use
our values, where will technologists ﬁnd these values to copy them into
their designs or to be guided by them? Will machines need values we do
not  possess,  because of  their  differences  from us,  and if  so,  who will
design these values? Here is a simple case of the need for new values to
be designed.
One domain  in  which  moral  and  social  values  are  presently  being
designed is the domain of driverless cars.  These cars,  which are being
designed by car and AI companies dedicated to proﬁt making, need to
appeal to the public, in order to sell. This background principle affects and
guides  the  design  of  values  for  the  way  driverless  cars  will  run
(Greenmeier  2016).  The  reason  why  we  speak  of  'designing  values'  in
relation to driverless cars is that we need to codify good road behaviour
into rules that can be implemented by the software of the car. These rules
must be such as to enable the car to respond to any type of situation,
combining  unusual  and  odd  circumstances  and,  particularly,  priorities.
For all these, which drivers handle on the basis of their developed driving
dispositions, which they put to action at a moment of need on the road,
the driverless car needs codes which will guide its actions. Some may be
circumstances that even humans do not have rules of thumb to follow,
such as the Trolley Example from philosophy, e.g. should one swerve left
to  avoid  killing  a  baby,  but  risking  killing  three  adults,  or  vice  versa?
However countless possibilities may arise. Can it be that a driverless car
causing  death  is  not  comparable  to  a  human  causing  death,  but
comparable to the Ministry of the Interior causing death by not spending
more funds on road safety? Can it be that new types of value need to be
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designed for cars; new types of culpability, which are neither human nor
institutional?
A far  more imperceptible  change of  value comes from a casual  social
media  habit  we  all  have.  They  have  now  developed  an  algorithm  at
Stanford, which collects and personalises the 'likes' and 'dislikes' a user
registers in social media (Kosinski/Stillwell/Graepel 2013). This collection
is then made available for commercial  use to advertisers,  to stores,  to
fundraising organisations, etc. Now one may wonder where the new value
was generated. It is the following: if  the data is sold to an agency that
proﬁles citizens for their political preferences, then the 'likes' and 'dislikes'
change their value for the user registering them, and become a public
political  statement  of  her  beliefs.  The  innocuous  'likes'  and  'dislikes'
acquire great civil value for the user in certain social contexts, while the
user is unaware of their value. More generally, our digital traces can be
used in ways that  retrospectively change their  value and their  standing
from their  original  use.  Since  everything  we do,  nowadays,  leaves  our
digital traces behind, everything we do may easily change its value for us,
once a smart programmer authors a new algorithm for commercial  or
political use.
III. Holding on to our Autonomy
In his TED Talk on digital DNA, Genomics researcher Jun Wang talked of
the 'Digital  me'  he has created of himself,  in the context of  a broader
programme  of  developing  digital  doppelgangers  of  real  people.  With
information about his own and other people's genetic code and health
habits, he has developed digital proﬁles of each, and hopes to optimise
personal and human health prospects by running tests of products and
food on the proﬁles (Wang 2017).
I  wish to present a different conception of our 'Digital Selves',  which is
coming to us uninvited and probably unintended, and which I believe will
not only revolutionise our social enterprise, but undermine the very fabric
of personal and public personhood.
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The Digital Me or Digital Self that I am talking about is the result of the fast-
developing intrusive digital technology. Already, computer technology can
detect emotions on the basis of facial analysis of people: 'IBM's Watson AI
can  now  understand  our  feelings'  (Moldrich  2016).  Soon,  our  mobile
phone will be able to read our emotions, our reactions to situations, our
feelings  for  those  around  us,  our  emotional  proﬁle,  even  our  moral
proﬁle,  our  health  condition,  our sexual  orientation  and  much,  much
more (Doerrfeld  2015).  However,  this  is  not  what  is  alarming!  What  is
alarming is that once such deep-learning algorithms are installed into our
mobiles, they will be able to judge better than we can judge in all these
domains (see e.g. Farnam Street 2017). Already, the algorithm that judges
the  sexual  orientation  of  men  is  more  accurate  that  human  such
judgements (Siddique 2015).
Deep-learning in AI is becoming very successful in developing algorithms
which  discern,  and  make  judgements  on  a  host  of  different
circumstances,  doing  so  better than  humans  can;  for  example,  facial
recognition, determination of sexual orientation, whether one is feeling
empathetic,  one's  current  emotional  disposition, and  many  more.
However, this is deep-learning only in its infancy. Very soon, algorithms
will  prove  to  be  better,  often  much  better,  than  humans  at  making
judgement in all  walks of life. We will  trust our mobiles to judge better
than we could our  feelings  towards others,  and theirs  towards us;  our
chances  of  professional  success;  our  children's  understanding  of  their
homework, and their chances of success in class and in sports; our trust
in the claims of others (including the news); and most signiﬁcantly, our
feelings and beliefs about ourselves. We will in consequence voluntarily ask
our mobiles to judge everything for us, because we will think they can do
a better job judging than we can. Alarmingly, we are already entering the
next  generation  in  the  design  of  algorithms,  the  post-deep-learning
generation of algorithms, where 'brain principles will be used in Machine
Intelligence' (NUMENTA 2017).
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IV. Mind the gap – the Agency Gap!
The natural  consequence of  this  is  that  others  will  not  respond to  us
according to how our behaviour strikes them; or think about us on that
basis; or judge us, and even feel for us feelings according to how we strike
them. Rather, they will respond, think, judge, feel for us according to what
their mobiles tell them we are. They will respond, think, judge, feel what
they do about our Digital Selves as these are discerned by their mobiles.
And we will do the same about them.
The Digital Self is not something each of us possesses: it is a digital proﬁle
of us which others will have, and will interact with. It is as if we walked
into a room, and all the others could see and respond to is our digital
doppelganger in the monitors of their mobiles, watches, or smart glasses.
The reason for this is that they will consider this digital doppelganger as
more  genuinely  'us',  than  their  own  conception  of  us,  because  this
doppelganger  will  have  been  constructed  on  truer,  more  accurate
judgements,  made  by  their  mobile  algorithms.  This  is  an  Agency  Gap,
between the humans' conception of who we are (our Human Selves) and
the algorithmic conception of who we are (that is,  our Digital Selves in
others' mobiles).
It gets more complex, as there is a second gap. When we decide and/or
we act, we will not do so according to what we judge, but according to
what our mobiles advise us to do. The set of algorithms in our mobiles,
advising us on our decisions and actions, will be our Second Digital Selves.
If the mobiles of others judge us from our facial expressions, they will not
“discern” what our mobiles decide for us to do. This will generate a Second
Agency Gap, between three agents: how others perceive us (our Human
Selves); how their algorithms discern us (our Digital Selves); and how our
mobile-algorithms guide us to decide and act (our Second Digital Selves).
However,  there  is  an  even  worse  fear.  We  will  eventually  relate  to
ourselves  by  conceiving  of  ourselves  according  to  how  our  mobiles
discern us. Our own self-conception will be mediated and shaped by what
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our mobile-algorithms tell us we are. We will end up trusting our mobiles
more than we trust our introspection. A not uncommon response to the
increasing intelligence of AI is Bostrom (2015), in his TED Talk, where he
expresses  the  hope  that  if  algorithms  develop  into  super-intelligent
beings, they will share our values and so we need not fear them. I would
never bet my life on such odds.
These changes are happening fast, and will thoroughly uproot the very
way we conceive of ourselves, and how relate to everyone else, including
our spouses, our children, our parents, and our best friends.
V. Towards designing and redesigning our wellbeing
How  can  we  address  this  emerging  problem  of  our  autonomy,  our
autonomous agency and the sense of who we are? It is impossible to stop
the progress of technology, for numerous psychological and sociological
reasons. Nevertheless, leaving the direction and degree of social change
to  technological  advancements  in  the  private  sector  would  be  socially
suicidal,  because  social  ﬂourishing  is  not  a  priority  in  a  business
company's list. If nothing else is done, we will rely on our mobiles to tell
us who and what we are.  We will thereby transfer  our  autonomy to our
digital selves, namely, to the sets of algorithms to which we have relegated
judging for us. It will feel as if we have consigned ourselves to our Wiser
Big Brothers, because they are better at judging than we are – judging and
deciding everything for us, about our environment and about ourselves.
How can we ﬂourish, in these circumstances? What does ﬂourishing even
mean, without autonomy and a sense of our own agency? Who is it that
would  be  ﬂourishing?  We  have  encountered  this  conception  of
ﬂourishing, early in the history of philosophy. Plato in his ideal state, in
the Republic, tells us that the Philosopher Kings will come to understand
the Good and what is good for society, and they will show the merchant
class, who will not be able to comprehend the Good, how to live best and
achieve  their  wellbeing.[1] In  that  context,  the  merchant class  have
deferred autonomy to the Philosopher Kings. Yet, since Aristotle, we have
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learned to endeavour to seek our wellbeing ourselves, based on what we
learn in society and what we can judge ourselves (Scaltsas 1996). But now,
it  appears we will  move from an Aristotelian conception of  well-being,
where we author our wellbeing and strive for our ﬂourishing on our own
devices, to a Platonic conception of well-being, where cognitively higher
experts  (in  this  case,  algorithms)  will  tell  us  how  to  live  and  how  to
ﬂourish. When IT companies exalt the services that IT devices will offer us
in the era of IoT, and tell us how such devices will empower us, they fail to
see and mention that they will also rob us of our autonomy and agency.
Do we want this? Is this inevitable,  as a result of the success of deep-
learning devices? If  we do not want to lose our autonomy, can we do
something about it to avoid it?
I  believe we can,  but  we will  need new values to  help us redeﬁne our
ﬂourishing, in view of the role that algorithms will play in our lives. So,
how do we design new values? How do we design new conceptions of
human ﬂourishing and wellbeing, rather than have them dictated to us by
deep-learners.  Presently,  we  do  not  even  learn  how  to  design  our
wellbeing, but shape it  piecemeal,  on the basis of directions we get at
home, at school, from friends and colleagues, and our own judgement.
This, though, will not suﬃce, because all of them will be replaced by better
judges, algorithms! How do we stay ahead of algorithmic advancement,
and  take  hold  of  change,  and  be  able  to  conﬁdently  allot  algorithmic
advice in its slot within our world-scheme, rather than allow them to a lot
us in the slot of 'users' of their advice.
The  need  for  such  an  education  is  urgent.  We  need  to  modify our
understanding of personal and social wellbeing. We need to be able to
design and redesign our conception of personal and social wellbeing, to
keep up with, and even get ahead of technological intrusiveness, least we
are ﬂattened and replaced in its wake. Most of all, we need to learn how
to creatively design new values, to design novel values of unprecedented
types, for unprecedented social circumstances, for us and our machines.
Yet, we need to start by learning how to design our wellbeing, before we
can aim for redesigning it in creative ways.
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VI. Valuative Intelligence
What I propose in this paper is that the general approach to the design of
new, even creative social values (including all types of value governing and
guiding our behaviours) is learning how to trade emotions for values and
vice versa.  This  is  a bold claim, which I  will  buttress with philosophical
tradition and neurological discovery, and a challenging one, in view of the
fact that nobody is being trained at school or university how to do so.
The  philosophical  tradition,  which  in  my  understanding  grounds  and
supports  the  inter-trading  of  emotions  and  values,  starts  with  Plato
(Cooper  1997),  and  culminates  with  Aristotle's  Theory  of  Deliberation
(Barnes  1984).  It  all  starts  with  Socrates'  Hedonic  Calculus,  in  Plato's
dialogue the Protagoras (Cooper 1997b, 35lb-358d) and the Phaedo (ibid.
1997a, 68c-69c). Socrates considers whether our good and wellbeing is a
good calculation of which pleasures to pursue, but ultimately rejects it in
favour of pursuing the good. Importantly for our purposes, Socrates here
distinguishes pleasure from the good, the latter given to us by rationality,
and hence distinguishes pleasurable activities from good activities for our
ﬂourishing. Thus, we cannot inter-trade pleasure and the good.
Plato, too, does not think that we can inter-trade pleasures and the good,
because  they  cannot  communicate  between  them  through  rationality;
appetitive desires are irrational, according to Plato.[2] However, I submit
that  Plato  made  a  breakthrough  that  paved  the  way  for  Aristotle  to
introduce what I call inter-trading of pleasures and the good, or better,
inter-trading  bodily  pleasures,  emotions  and  values  in  our  pursuit  of
wellbeing.  The  breakthrough  is  that  there  are  'rational  desires'.  This
comes in the exposition by Plato of the Tripartite Division of the Soul,
which  classiﬁes  the  motivations  we  have  for  decision  and  action  into
three:  the  Rational  motivations;  the  Emotive  motivations;  and  the
Appetitive motivations.  What I  consider Plato's  breakthrough is  that all
three  types  are  presented  as  desires,  which  shows  them  to  have  a
common genus, at some level of classiﬁcation: rational desires; emotive
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desires;  and  appetitive  desires. The  philosophical  tradition  and
commentating  on  Plato's  work  has  considered  the  irrationality  of  the
appetites as determining the breakdown of communication between the
three  parts  of  the  soul.  I  am  saying,  by  contrast,  that  their  common
desiderative genus can become the ground for the development of an
exchange between them, which is what I have argued Aristotle has done
in his theory of ethical deliberation.
The Rational part of our soul, speaking Platonese, may be motivated to
seek  healthy  pursuits;  the  Emotive  part  may  be  motivated  to  aim for
honour  or  an  emotion;  and  the  Appetitive  part  may  be  motivated  to
pursue bodily activities and desires. As soon as one recognises that there
are desires that are generated by rationality, namely, rational desires, as
Plato  recognised  through  the  Rational  part  of  the  soul,  pone  is
introducing a desiderative-lingua-franca between the parts of the soul, even
if reason cannot function as lingua-franca between them. Reason can prevail
by the strength of the rational desires as desires, rather than by convincing
appetites through reasoning – which it cannot do, since appetites are not
sensitive to reason. The exegetical tradition has understood the Platonic
trichotomy  as  documenting  the  breakdown  of  communication.  I  am
suggesting that, on the contrary, it opens the way for the communication
between  all  the  parts  of  the  soul:  goodness  can  be  achieved  by  the
balanced satisfaction of the desires of the three parts of the soul.
The difference between the (early-Plato)  Socratic  Hedonic Calculus and
the  (middle-Plato)  Tripartite  Division  of  the  Soul  is  that,  once  rational
desires are introduced, which are desires stemming from what we now
call values, e.g. for health, wellbeing can be pursued by balancing these
desires  –  by  running  the  Hedonic  Calculus  across  rational,  emotive,
appetitive desires. Plato did not see this, because he thought there is an
insurmountable obstacle between rational and appetitive desires.[3] I am
claiming Aristotle saw this possibility, and explained it, introducing even
pleasures of  virtuous activities from the satisfaction of  rational  desires,
and implemented it. This is why I see Aristotle as ﬁnally paying justice to
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what  Socrates  was  trying  to  do  with  his  Hedonic  Calculus  in  Plato's
Protagoras.
Aristotle  has  a  different  conception  of  the  human  soul  than  Plato,
believing that the soul is divided into a Rational and an Irrational part, but
where the Irrational part is sensitive to the Rational one.[4] What does
sensitivity mean or entail? It means that the agent has methods by which
to train and to shape their irrational desires to accord with the rational
ones. For example, if one believes that excessively fatty food is unhealthy
for them to consume, they may train themselves not to desire such food.
As that agent trains her appetites to dislike excessively fatty food, she is
enabling her appetites to 'listen' to reason by becoming shaped (through
training)  by considerations of  reason.  There are many qualiﬁcations to
this  method,  having  to  do with  the  age of  the  agent,  the  type of  the
desire,  the method of training them, etc.,  but we will  not get into this
discussion here. Rather, we leave it as a subsequent question to pursue,
for the educational programme that would follow from this proposal of
inter-trading  appetites,  emotions  and  values  in  the  pursuit  of  our
wellbeing.
Aristotle  holds  that  our  wellbeing can be achieved as  the harmonious
activity of rational biological organisms. It is what we may call a 'Holistic
Hedonic Calculus', where the holism will be explained below as the agent's
ability  to  reshape  the  desiderative  parts  to  ﬁt  the  eudaimonic  whole
through joint satisfaction. The argument for this position is complex, and
involves  the Doctrine  of  the Mean,  as  Aristotle  understood it,  and his
Function  Argument  for  human  beings,  which  I  will  not  discuss  here
(Scaltsas  1996).  What  I  will  point  out  here is  that  his  argument  is  not
intellectualist.  I  submit  that  Aristotle  does  not  set  rationality  as  the
ultimate  common  denominator,  the  way  Plato  did.  For  Aristotle,  I
contend, rationality is constituted by the Holistic Hedonic Calculus of the
harmonious pleasurable activity of the totality of one's desires.
Aristotle  seeks  to  harmonise the  desires  of  the  soul  (Scaltsas  1996,
299-302).  Harmonising them will  be guided by the experience we have
inherited from our elders, and from our own experience, understood as a
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whole through rationality. Rationality is not presupposed as a primitive it
is built up, bottom-up.[5] Reason and the rational desires are put to the
test, and are shaped and reshaped along with the rest of our desires, to
ﬁnally deliver the best balance for the achievement of harmony in the
satisfaction of the desires of the whole soul. It is what we might call a rich
conception of rationality, grounding the achievement of wellbeing. What I
have been referring to as the inter-trading of appetites, emotions and values
is exactly this shaping and reshaping of desires of all kinds, of the rational
organism,  to achieve harmony between them. Rational  desires ground
values and motivate us towards values; emotive desires ground moods
and attitudes, and motivate us towards items we feel for; and appetitive
desires ground sensations and passions of various types, and motivate us
towards 'objects of  desire'.  Harmony between them is not a matter of
balancing them against each other; it  is a matter of shaping them and
reshaping them to achieve a type of unity in the activities of the rational
biological  organism,  which  the  ancients  called  eudaimonia and we call
ﬂourishing and wellbeing. Wellbeing is not a sensation of pleasure, or an
emotion  of  happiness,  or  an  experience  of  satisfaction.  Wellbeing  is
activity, it is a way of living life that achieves harmonious satisfaction of our
rational, emotive and appetitive desires.
Is Aristotle, or the reading of Aristotle I propose, credible and sound? Can,
indeed, emotions and appetites be traded for and reshaped with rational
values, and vice versa? Can this trading require or result in new types of
value and feeling which we will design? My claim is that we can take this
step  conﬁdently,  going  a  step  beyond  what  Aristotle  described,  by
allowing for the creative design of values, emotions and appetites I base
my  claim  on  the  Aristotelian  background  theory  of  wellbeing,  and  on
neuroscientist's Antonio Damasio's ﬁndings that the origins of our mental
life,  which  governs  our  behaviour,  including  appetites,  emotions  and
values, are physical feelings (his somatic marker hypothesis, e.g. itching,
hunger,  longing,  etc.)  (Damasio  2008,  1991).  Physical  -feelings  have
grounded the desires (Lenzen 2013) that turn out to be our evolutionary
currency for appetitive, emotional and valuative reactions to the world.
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VII. Neuroscience in support of the Holistic Hedonic Calculus
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According to Damasio (2001), physical feelings were the proto-conceptual;
proto-emotional; and proto-valuative experiences of the 'mind'. Physical
feelings  grounded  emotional  reactions  (widely  speaking)  towards  the
environment, which have been the fundamental currency of the mental in
its  evolutionary  history.  These  emotional  reactions  can  be  organised,
classiﬁed, streamlined, to ground mental conceptions, dispositions, and
principles that govern our lives (Stenning 2002, 263-266). Backtracking on
our evolution, we can 'liquefy' the mental conceptions, dispositions, and
principles we have developed into the currency of positive and negative
emotional reactions, or desires at large (which were originally grounded
on physical feelings), in order to redesign these desires and reconﬁgure
them into new forms of conceptions, dispositions, and principles that will
facilitate our ﬂourishing and wellbeing. Experiments of Antonio Damasio,
which have shown that emotions (i.e.  desires at large) are much more
primitive,  as  a  ground  of  reasoning  and  of  decisions  to  behave,  than
concepts  (Damasio  2010,  2003,  1999).  Emotions  (broadly  understood)
have guided action, pre-conceptually, as early in the evolutionary chain as
before  simple  organisms  were  formed  –  when  there  were  only  gene
formations  of  life.  Concepts  came  much  later,  not  to  replace  the
behavioural  compass  of  emotions,  but  as  an  additional  layer  of
organisation of mental life, to guide behaviour, in working out the utility
and functionality  of  emotional  evaluations  of  the  environment  for  the
organism. Stenning (2002) built, theoretically, on the experimental results
of  Damasio,  utilising  Wittgenstein's  semantic  theory  of  deﬁnition,  and
explained  how  emotions  operate  as  the  ground  of  abstracting and  of
classifying, on the basis of similarities of impact of the environment on
the organism. More generally, the way the world impacts emotionally on
us  grounds  the  way  we  comprehend  our  world.  We  classify  things,
activities, and relations in our environment on the basis of the feelings
generated in  us  from infancy  in  our  interaction with  our  environment
(Stenning 2002).  It  is  emotions that  underlie  analogy,  comparison,  and
similarity. The concepts we use to classify and order our representations
of what there is around us have non-linear, affective foundations; these
affective  foundations  predate,  evolutionarily,  the  creation  of  language,
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and have guided our behaviour towards others, and towards cooperative
or adversarial situations in our environment.
VIII. Teaching the creative design of wellbeing
We live in an era of constant radical change: of environmental, social, and
digital transformations. Our possibilities for ﬂourishing and for wellbeing
alter drastically every decade, and soon, every year, rather than every era.
We face the need of designing and redesigning our wellbeing ourselves, if
we are to attain ﬂourishing within our lifetime,  let  alone to ﬂourish in
every phase of our lives. How do we do this, in the midst of digital social
ﬂux? What we learned as children about ﬂourishing and wellbeing from
home and school does not suﬃce for guiding us through the new digital
infringements and predicaments. How do we design, and redesign anew
our wellbeing?
The educational challenge goes deeper. At school we are taught how to
solve conceptual problems. Wellbeing is not a conceptual puzzle; it  is a
problem  that  involves  conceptual,  emotional,  appetitive  and  valuative
incongruities,  together,  which we need to  smooth out,  so  as  to  attain
goodness in our lives. Smoothing out incongruities can be achieved only
by redesigning our desires through training. So here is the new challenge:
How  does  one  solve  the  problem  of  redesigning  concepts,  emotions,
appetites, and values, in order to handle the radical ﬂux of algorithmic
digital intrusions into our lives? We conducted an experiment to ﬁnd out.
In Project C2Learn (2012-2015) about teaching 'emotive lateral thinking' in
schools, during the pilot phase of the project, our educators asked the
participating students 'Socratic Questions', to understand their process of
thinking,  which  motivated  them  to  propose  creative  solutions to  the
problems  we  had  posed  to  them  (Stenning  et.al.  2016).  What  soon
became clear to us was that, intuitively, the students were putting into
practice  Aristotle's  intuitions  about  deliberation,  vindicating  Damasio's
(2010, 2003, 1999) conjectures about the origins of our mental life and the
primacy of  emotions  and  feelings  in  our  mental  evolution.  What  the
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students were doing was to search and ﬁnd ways to 'trade off' values for
emotions,  in their effort to plot ways out of the predicaments we had
presented them with in our stories.
We  presented  intractable  social  problems  to  school  students  in  three
different European countries, and suggested methods to them of how to
go about devising conceptions of wellbeing for exactly such incongruous
circumstances. Our goal was to see if they could cope with the challenges,
and if yes, what the mechanism was for achieving the goal of innovating
new shapes and colours of human wellbeing.
They surprised us. We gave them stories, with dissonant social situations
they had not encountered before, and they innovated in their design of
possibilities for ﬂourishing in them. They did it effortlessly, uninhibitedly,
but sensibly. So, what did we learn from them? We learned that they can
understand how appetites,  emotions  and values  can be designed and
redesigned,  by  'liquefying'  them,  recalibrating  them,  recombining  and
remixing them with appropriate training. The 'key' for this procedure was:
trading,  negotiating,  mixing,  carving  up,  and  redistributing  appetites,
emotions and values,  which initially  had seemed resistant to bartering
and reshaping.
This is what we need to introduce in educational training in schools, in
order for students to learn to design values and emotional responses to
challenging  predicaments,  rather  than  learn  to  'conform'  to  these
demanding  circumstances  and  accept  their  inevitability.  When
systematised,  this  training  will  involve  Emotional  Intelligence  and
Valuative Intelligence, explaining the methodological differences between
them. This would empower students, and any adults so trained, offering
them understanding and showing them how to take the 'pilot seat' in the
algorithmic  challenges  we  will  face  in  the  era  of  the  smart  IoT,  by
designing themselves and their own future wellbeing.
Explaining what Valuative Intelligence is to school students is demanding
and requires a panoply of  examples,  suitable for different ages,  about
how we can generate new values, as opposed to simply inheriting them
through  social  media  interactions  and  social  traditions.  We  need  to
Scaltsas Valuative IntelligenceThe Creative Design of our Wellbeing
medienimpulse, Jg. 55, Nr. 4, 2017 17
explain  to  students  what  'value  hacking'  is,  by  the  deep-learning
algorithms of intrusive digital technologies in the smart IoT era, and show
them how they can,  in response,  design and shape their  own values –
whether moral, social, cultural, gender, ethnic, racial, etc. values.
It is essential to begin teaching this skill to all: students and adults alike.
The method has been given to us by Aristotle: Deliberation, which is the
ability to weigh up and rationally trade (by training) emotions, feelings, and
values, in order to attain a coherent and harmonious operation of the
total activity of a human organism.[6] However, going beyond Aristotle[7]
we need to learn to design new types of value, and new types of feeling to
situations,  in  order  to  respond to  unprecedented social  circumstances
that  await  us  in  the  coming  days.  Emotional  Intelligence  will  help  us
identify our emotions, feelings and attachments towards situations and
people,  including  ourselves  (Goleman  1995).  Valuative  Intelligence  will
help  us  identify  our  commitments  to  principles  that  govern  our
behaviour, and the reasons for them. We need to learn how to let our
Emotional  Intelligence  communicate  with  our  Valuative  Intelligence,  in
order to keep building conceptions of wellbeing that will incorporate the
changes in society rather than surrender to them.
IX. Conclusion
Our intuitions are not suﬃcient to guide us through the search for our
wellbeing. The demands of continuous social ﬂux are too challenging and
urgent  to  face  them  untrained  in  Valuative  Intelligence.  Traditionally,
parents and schools teach society's code of ethical behaviour to young
people, and the professions to adults – the do's and don'ts. Nevertheless,
bygone are the days of aspiring and acquiescing to 'leaving things as we
found them';  things  as  we found them cannot  cope with  the changes
happening  from  every  direction,  nowadays.  Today's  changes  of  the
environment,  of  society,  and of  smart  IoT technology are fundamental
and uprooting.  Students and young adults  will  not  be able to use the
emotional  and  valuative  solutions  for  wellbeing  that  worked  for  their
parents,  which  they  learned  from  their  parents.  In  addition  to  the
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wellbeing  codes  of  their  parents,  young  people  need  to  learn  how to
design their own codes of wellbeing, lest algorithms do so for them. They
are not taught this skill anywhere, at present; but training them so would
equip  them  to  conﬁgure,  themselves,  ways  of  ﬂourishing,  despite  the
incongruities they will face in their social environments. Students need to
learn  if  and  how goals,  feelings,  and  principles  can or  cannot be
reconﬁgured, in order to attain the elusive wellbeing in today's society. If
we do not empower them so, the changes of smart IoT will roller-coaster
over their lives.
[1] Plato, 'Unless .  .  .  philosophers become kings in the cities or those
whom we now call kings and rulers philosophize truly and adequately and
there is a conjunction of political power and philosophy . . . there can be
no cessation of evils . . . for cities nor, I think, for the human race.' (Rep. V.
473c11–d6)
[2] Republic 439c-d: 'there is something in the soul ... with which it loves,
hungers, thirsts, and feels the ﬂutter and titillation of other desires, the
irrational and  appetitive—companion  of  various  repletions  and
pleasures”.
[3] According to Plato, appetitive desires are a-rational, namely, they are
not sensitive to rational considerations. Plato's example is that when one
is thirsty, one wants a drink, rather than a healthy drink; thirst does not
recognise  healthiness  as  an  advantage  of  some  drinks  over  others,
making them 'good' or 'better' drinks. In consequence, the Rational part
of the soul needs to impose itself on the other parts, especially on the
Appetitive  desires,  in  order  to  satisfy  only  the  desires  that  would  not
undermine the pursuit of the Rational ones. In other words, wellbeing is
achieved, according to Plato, only by the use of self-control in the pursuit
of the soul's desires, frustrating some in order to pursue others. Plato,
Republic IV 436e–441c.
[4] 'The appetitive and in general the desiring element [in the soul] in a
sense shares in it  [in the rational  principle of  the soul],  in so far as it
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listens to and obeys it; this is the sense in which we speak of paying heed
to one's father or one's friend.' (Nicomachean Ethics, 1102b 30–32).
[5] I believe that this includes the Principle of Non-Contradiction, which
Aristotle discusses us in Metaphysics Γ (Gamma) 3–6; but I will not argue
for it here. Aristotle says is that even if one denies the Principle of Non-
Contradiction verbally, her behaviour will betray her: 'For why does a man
walk to Megara and not stay at home, when he thinks he ought to be
walking there? Why does he not walk early some morning into a well or
over a precipice, if one happens to be in his way? Why do we observe him
guarding against this, evidently because he does not think that falling in is
alike good and not good? Evidently, then, he judges one thing to be better
and another worse.' (Metaphysics, 1008b 14–19).
[6] Aristotle says:  'it  is  held to be the mark of a prudent [phronimos =
practically wise] man to be able to deliberate well about what is good and
advantageous for himself, not in some one department, for instance what
is good for his health or strength, but what is advantageous to the good
life in general [eu zên ólôs = wellbeing].' (Nicomachean Ethics, 1140a 25–
28).
[7] This  is  deliberately  provocative.  Aristotle  standardly  said  that  we
deliberate  about  the  means  for  an  action  e.g.  Nicompachean  Ethics
1112b15-20; but he also said, enigmatically, that 'Virtue makes the target
[the end] right; practical wisdom makes the things towards it [right; i.e.
the means]' (EN 1144a7-9). However, since virtue is developed by training
in the values of society, the possibility emeges of diverging from tradition,
when society designes new values through such training.
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